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IN A TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN WORLD 
 
Rachael Roseman* 
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Road: Rethinking the Expansion of the Fourth Amendment in a 
Technology-Driven World, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2013), available at 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i1/article3.pdf.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] On a cool summer morning in upstate New York, a man sitting on 
his couch types in the coordinates to a warehouse in Virginia on his phone 
and presses “engage.”  At that moment, the engine of a vehicle several 
miles away starts up, and the vehicle slowly backs out of the driveway.  
Without a driver or any occupants, the vehicle travels several hundred 
miles from the driveway in New York to the warehouse in Virginia.  
Meanwhile, the man who engaged the vehicle remains seated on his couch 
in upstate New York.  The man has engaged an autonomous vehicle (AV), 
capable of operating entirely independent from any human intervention 
and capable of complying with traffic laws.1  
 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate 2014, Michigan State University College of Law; B.S. 2011, Liberal 
Studies, Grand Valley State University. I would like to thank Professor Catherine Grosso 
for her encouragement and advice throughout the drafting of this Note. Thank you also to 
the editors of the Michigan State Law Review for their help in the initial stages of this 
Note and to the Richmond Journal of Law and Technology for their tireless work on this 
piece.  
 
1 See Sebastian Thrun, What We’re Driving At, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Oct. 9, 2010), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com.au/2010/10/what-were-driving-at.html [hereinafter “What 
We’re Driving At”].   
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[2] While this may seem like a perfectly harmless and legal activity, 
the potential legal ramifications and the potential effect on individual 
liberty are immense.  Prior to engaging the vehicle, an associate of the 
man on the couch retrofit the vehicle with additional cargo holds to store 
hundreds of pounds of cocaine and marijuana.  Currently, police use 
traffic stops and drug-interdiction stops as a method to fight the “war on 
drugs.”2  The Fourth Amendment permits these stops as long as the officer 
has reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a law has been 
broken.3  Alternatively, officers can search vehicles for contraband if they 
have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found therein.4  
Since the AV is designed to abide traffic laws,5 it is unlikely that there 
would be a lawful reason for an officer to stop the vehicle based on 
probable cause that a traffic violation occurred.  Since there is no 
occupant, officers cannot observe the behavior of the driver as officers 
often do in hopes of gaining reasonable suspicion to make a stop.6  
Without probable cause that a law has been broken, or reasonable 
suspicion to stop the vehicle, the Fourth Amendment does not permit an 
officer to stop the vehicle.  The introduction of AVs into our society may 
shift the way we look at the Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
jurisprudence and the ability of the police to make drug-interdiction stops, 
but ultimately, AVs will remain stoppable under the Fourth Amendment. 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic Stops: The 
Troubled Jurisprudence of a Doomed Drug Interdiction Technique, 28 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 1, 3-6 (2001). 
 
3 See id. at 4 (explaining the procedure of drug-interdiction stops); see also infra Part 
II.C. 
 
4 See infra Part II.C.2. 
 
5 See Susan Kuchinskas, Crash Course: Training the Brain of a Driverless Car, SCI. AM. 
(Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=autonomous-
driverless-car-brain. 
 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (finding border patrol 
agents had reasonable suspicion based largely on the agent’s observations of the 
occupants of the vehicle).  Without occupants such observation would be impossible. 
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Though the police may be slightly more restricted in stopping AVs, any 
increase in the government’s power to stop automobiles could be 
devastating to our privacy, and courts should refrain from increasing the 
government’s power in this arena.  
 
[3] This Note examines the current state of Fourth Amendment search 
and seizure jurisprudence with relation to automobiles to illustrate how 
AVs may change this area of law. Part I examines the history and 
development of AVs and current regulation of the vehicles.  Part II 
discusses Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, including the history of 
automobile searches, stops, and consent to search. Part III illustrates how 
AVs will slightly change the police’s ability to make drug-interdiction 
stops, and how this may affect our privacy interests in the future, 
ultimately concluding that any further extension of the Fourth Amendment 
will unconstitutionally violate our right to be free from unreasonable 
government intrusion.  
 
I.  THE BEGINNING OF AVS 
 
[4] In 1962, Hanna-Barbera Studios released a cartoon set in a 
futuristic city in 2062.7 The Jetsons featured futuristic inventions ranging 
from a robotic maid to flying cars.8  The utility of George Jetson's flying 
car is illustrated in the introduction to the show, where George can be seen 
taking his hands off the control panel and attending to his family.9  The 
Jetsons gave us a glimpse into the world of the future—a world that is 
becoming reality.  
                                                 
7 See Grey Hall, Space Family 2062: The Jetsons, EXAMINER.COM (Oct. 11, 2013), 
http://www.examiner.com/article/space-family-2062-the-jetsons. 
 
8 See Jennifer Dudley-Nicholson, The Jetsons’ Visions of the Future 51 Years Ago Spot-
On, NEWS.COM.AU (Sept. 23, 2013, 2:25 PM), http://www.news.com.au/technology/the-
jetsons8217-vision-of-the-future-51-years-ago-spoton/story-e6frfro0-1226725268775. 
 
9 See guillermo3650, The Jetsons TV Intro, YOUTUBE (Jan. 19, 2008), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yjy-fnsmWR4. 
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A.  An Autonomous What? 
 
[5] For years, various agencies and departments have been trying to 
perfect a vehicle of the future like the one featured in The Jetsons.  Over 
the last several decades, and more rapidly in the past several years, 
innovators across the automotive and technology sectors have been 
inching closer to this futuristic technology.10 
 
1.  The History of AVs 
 
[6] Discussion of AVs started in 1939 at the World’s Fair where 
General Motors showcased its Futurama exhibit predicting AVs would be 
standard by the 1960s.11 While AVs were not standard by then, 
development actually began as early as the 1980s with the initiation of the 
EUREKA12 PROMETHEUS program in Europe.13 The program focused 
on developing computer-aided driving systems that would use “electronic 
traffic-flow monitors to increase communication among drivers and 
automatically detect any risk of collision.”14 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Chloe Albanesius, Google Car: Not the First Self-Driving Vehicle, PCMAG 
(Oct. 11, 2010, 3:55 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2370598,00.asp.  
 
11 Daniel Bartz, Autonomous Cars Will Make Us Safer, WIRED (Nov. 16, 2009, 8:00 
AM), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2009/11/autonomous-cars.  
 
12 The EUREKA program was a research and development cooperative between nineteen 
European countries aimed at bringing innovative technologies to the market.  See David 
Dickson, EUREKA!, TECH. REV., Aug. 1988, at 27. 
 
13 See id. at 28.  PROMETHEUS stands for the Program for European Traffic and 
Highest Efficiency and Unprecedented Safety.  Id. 
 
14 Id.  A similar technology, now known as vehicle communication systems, is still in the 
works, though proponents of AVs argue that the costly infrastructure required by those 
systems make AVs more practical.  See Transcript of The Future of Driving, THE DIANE 
REHM SHOW, at 10:24:33-10:25:49 (Sept. 27, 2012, 10:06 AM), 
http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2012-09-27/future-driving/transcript.  Testing of 
vehicle-to-vehicle communication (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) 
communication is ongoing, but Dr. Alberto Broggi, IEEE senior member and professor of 
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[7] Later, the Defense Department’s DARPA15 Grand Challenges 
were initiated, not to increase the safety of the general public on the roads, 
but to reduce the number of soldiers who are exposed to dangerous 
conditions in war zones.16  DARPA hosted a total of three Challenges with 
participants from Germany, Australia, universities, various industries, 
private individuals, and even a high school.17  The first two events, held in 
2004 and 2005, required the AVs to navigate through the desert on 
different road conditions, through obstacles, and through areas with little 
or no global positioning system (GPS) service.18  The 2004 Challenge 
required participants to traverse a 150-mile course, but unfortunately, none 
of the fifteen qualifiers succeeded.19  Just a year later, five teams 
                                                                                                                         
computer engineering at the University of Parma, notes that the current AVs being 
developed require less rather than more infrastructure.  See Doug Newcomb, You Won’t 
Need a Driver’s License by 2040, WIRED (Sept. 17, 2012, 1:42 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/09/ieee-autonomous-2040/ [hereinafter 
“Newcomb”]. 
 
15 DARPA stands for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.  Our Work, 
DARPA, http://www.darpa.mil/our_work/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).  
 
16 Christian Berger et al., introduction to EXPERIENCE FROM THE DARPA URBAN 
CHALLENGE 3, 4 (Christopher Rouff & Mike Hinchey eds., 2012); see Overview, 
DARPA, http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge/overview.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 
2013).  DARPA’s rationale for the Urban Challenge:  
 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Public 
Law 106-398, Congress mandated in Section 220 that “It shall be a goal 
of the Armed Forces to achieve the fielding of unmanned, remotely 
controlled technology such that . . . by 2015, one-third of the 
operational ground combat vehicles are unmanned.”  
 
Id. 
 
17 Berger et al., supra note 16, at 4. 
 
18 Id. at 4-5. 
 
19 Id. at 5.  The Carnegie Mellon University Red Team’s vehicle the “Sandstorm” went 
the farthest, but it only made it 7.4 miles.  Id. 
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completed the second DARPA Grand Challenge, and the vehicle 
“Stanley” from Stanford University took home the $2 million prize.20 
 
[8] Following the success of the 2005 Grand Challenge, DARPA held 
its first Urban Challenge, which required the AVs to navigate through an 
urban environment rather than the rural environment used in the previous 
Challenges.21  The AVs were required to complete the sixty-mile course 
within six hours, while following all relevant traffic laws and navigating 
through obstacles like busy intersections and lane changes.22  While the 
teams received data about the routes prior to the race,23 “freely navigatable 
[sic] zones” required the AVs to navigate through areas without any lane 
markings and to find a previously assigned parking space.24  Moreover, 
the vehicles were able to use GPS; however, they had to be able to 
navigate without it while remaining in their lane in areas of GPS outage or 
with insufficient GPS signal quality.25  The team from Carnegie Mellon 
placed first with its vehicle, “Boss.”26  While the Urban Challenge brought 
us one step closer to a product that could be operated on public roads, it 
                                                 
20 Id.  This illustrates how quickly the technology is evolving.  
 
21 Id. at 3, 5-6. 
 
22 Berger et al., supra note 16, at 6.  The course also featured fifty human driven vehicles 
around which the AVs had to safely maneuver.  Id. 
 
23 Id. at 9.  A route network definition file (RNDF) was given to the teams twenty-four 
hours before the race, which gave participants details about the road networks the 
vehicles would face during the challenge.  Id.  The mission data files (MDF), which 
provided information about the start and end points of the race, were given to teams five 
minutes before the race and five minutes before the start of each mission.  Id. 
 
24 Id. at 10. 
 
25 Id. 
 
26 Id. at 7.  Stanford’s “Junior” took second, and Virginia Tech’s “Odin” took third place.  
Id.; see also Video and Animations from the NQE, STANFORD RACING TEAM, 
http://cs.stanford.edu/group/roadrunner/video.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (featuring 
several videos of Junior in action during the qualifying rounds).  
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did not require the AVs to detect or react to traffic signals or pedestrians—
a feat necessary before AVs can be sold to the general public.27  
 
2.  AVs Today 
 
[9] The most widely recognized AV today is the “Google Car.”28  Dr. 
Sebastian Thrun, the lead engineer of Stanford’s Racing Team and the 
Director of the Stanford Artificial Intelligence Lab,29 is one of the 
engineers of the project.30  The Google Team is comprised of leading 
engineers in the field, including Chris Urmson,31 Mike Montemerlo,32 and 
Anthony Levandowski.33  Thrun and the Google Team’s efforts were 
                                                 
27 See Berger et al., supra note 16, at 10.  
 
28 See Google, Self-Driving Car Test: Steve Mahan, YOUTUBE (Mar. 28, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cdgQpa1pUUE.  This YouTube video produced by 
Google not only shows the Google Car in action, but also shows one of the many benefits 
these vehicles can bring to the general public.  See id. 
 
29 The Team, STANFORD RACING TEAM, 
http://cs.stanford.edu/group/roadrunner/team.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).  Dr. Thrun 
was the lead engineer of “Stanley,” winner of the second DARPA Grand Challenge and 
“Junior,” runner up in the Urban Challenge.  See Thrun Reappears with Google Backing: 
Cars that Drive Themselves, Q. NEWSL. OF THE INST. OF NAVIGATION (The Inst. of 
Navigation, Manassas, Va.), Fall 2010, at 12.  
 
30 See Sebastian Thrun: Google’s Driverless Car, TED (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.ted.com/talks/sebastian_thrun_google_s_driverless_car.html [hereinafter 
Google’s Driverless Car]. 
 
31 What We’re Driving At, supra note 1.  Chris Urmson was the leader of the technical 
team for Carnegie Mellon, the team that won the 2007 Urban Challenge.  Id. 
 
32 Id.  Mike Montemerlo led the software development for the 2005 Stanford Racing 
Team.  Id. 
 
33 Id.  Anthony Levandowski helped build the first autonomous motorcycle and a Prius 
that delivered a pizza without a driver inside.  Id. 
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guided by a desire to reduce automobile injuries and fatalities.34  
According to the Google Car project manager Anthony Levandowski, 
there are 40,000 casualties in America from automobile accidents and 
approximately ninety percent are a result of human error.35  As of October 
2010, the Google Car had already driven 140,000 miles through California 
and the surrounding areas without an accident; that number is now well 
above 300,000.36 
 
[10] The Google Car is equipped with several sensors to enable it to 
“see”37 the world around it.38  Cameras on the vehicle look at traffic lights, 
while lasers “measure the world all around it in three dimensions and 
radars [] track other vehicles and their speeds.”39  A central computer in 
the vehicle then processes the information and allows the vehicle to make 
decisions based on the data received.40  In addition, the Google Car 
utilizes GoogleMaps and GPS technology, though the vehicles do not rely 
                                                 
34 See id.; Google’s Driverless Car, supra note 30.  This video also illustrates the 
technology in use.  Id.    
 
35 The Future of Driving, supra note 14, at 10:09:24. 
 
36 What We’re Driving At, supra note 1; see also Doug Newcomb, Feds Try to Stay 
Ahead of the Rise of the Robo-Car, WIRED (Oct. 24, 2012, 1:28 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/10/nhtsa-autonomous-cars/.  Thrun also notes that 
throughout the testing Google has always had a driver in the vehicle to ensure the testing 
is conducted as safely as possible.  What We’re Driving At, supra note 1. 
 
37 Erico Guizzo, How Google’s Self-Driving Car Works, IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 18, 2011, 
9:00 AM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/how-
google-self-driving-car-works#.  
 
38 The Future of Driving, supra note 14, at 10:10:25. 
 
39 Id.  
 
40 Id. 
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on GPS to stay within a designated lane.41  While the Google Car and its 
technology is probably the most widely known, especially outside of the 
technology sector, Google is not alone in AV development.42  BMW has 
implemented a system called ConnectedDrive Connect, which is designed 
to provide lower-level automated technology, though it has completed 
over 5,000 kilometers in “highly-automated” mode.43  Similarly, Volvo is 
developing a system intended to navigate traffic jams or traffic moving up 
to 31 miles per hour.44  Volvo’s technology is not yet fully autonomous, 
but Volvo hopes to achieve that goal in the future.45  General Motors has 
also been developing a similar technology called “Super Cruise,” which is 
                                                 
41 See What We’re Driving At, supra note 1.  Anthony Levandowski explains that GPS is 
helpful to know what town the vehicle is in, but the intricacies of driving are handled by 
the sensors.  The Future of Driving, supra note 14, at 10:11:34. 
 
42 Google is exclusively developing fully autonomous technology, while many of the 
other manufacturers are developing incremental technology like driver assistance 
programs that can be implemented more quickly than fully autonomous technology.  See 
supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text; infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.  
 
43 Peter Murray, A Look at BMW’s Semi-Autonomous Driving Car, SINGULARITY HUB 
(Feb. 2, 2012, 7:29 AM), http://singularityhub.com/2012/02/02/a-look-at-bmws-semi-
autonomous-driving-car/; see also BMW ConnectedDrive, BMW, 
http://www.bmw.com/com/en/insights/technology/technology_guide/articles/connecteddr
ive.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).  
 
44 Jeffrey N. Ross, Watch Volvo’s Autonomous Car System in Action, Before It Shows Up 
in 2014, AUTOBLOG (Oct. 24, 2012, 7:31 PM), 
http://www.autoblog.com/2012/10/24/watch-volvos-autonomous-car-system-in-action-
before-it-shows-u/. 
 
45 See id.  Volvo was also involved in the SARTRE (Safe Road Trains for the 
Environment) project, a collaboration by several European corporations, which just last 
year successfully completed a road train on public roads in Europe.  See SupercarHall, 
2012 Volvo—SARTRE Road Train on Public Road (A-roll), YOUTUBE (May 28, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-jQ1U9KZfWg.  A road train is a convoy led by a 
human driver.  Id.  The remaining cars in the convoy are in autonomous mode and 
communicate wirelessly with the lead vehicle.  Id.  This video illustrates the technology 
as well as the process of initiated autonomous mode.  See id. 
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capable of steering, braking, and keeping a vehicle in its lane.46  Lastly, in 
early January 2013, Toyota announced its Lexus Advanced Active Safety 
Research Vehicle.47  At this point the vehicle is intended to be semi-
autonomous, or to act as a “co-pilot,” but Toyota suspects its technology 
will evolve into a fully autonomous vehicle.48 
 
[11] AVs are coming.49  General Motors expects semi-autonomous 
vehicles to be on the market by the middle of the decade and fully 
autonomous vehicles to be available by the end of the decade.50  Some 
estimate that driver’s licenses will be a thing of the past by 2040, and the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) predicts seventy-
five percent of all vehicles on the road will be fully autonomous by that 
same time.51  In fact, society—rather than technology—may pose the 
                                                 
46 Self-Driving Car in Cadillac’s Future, CADILLAC NEWS (Apr. 20, 2012), 
http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/cadillac/news.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/20
12/Apr/0420_cadillac.html.  
 
47 Erico Guizzo, Toyota’s Semi-Autonomous Car Will Keep You Safe, IEEE SPECTRUM 
(Jan. 8, 2013, 5:51 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-
intelligence/toyota-semi-autonomous-lexus-car-will-keep-you-safe.  
 
48 Id.  The hardware on Toyota’s vehicle is almost the same as that used on the Google 
Car, so it seems entirely plausible that this vehicle will develop into a fully autonomous 
vehicle in the future.  Id. 
 
49 See Jim Motavalli, Self-Driving Cars Will Take Over by 2040, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2012, 
11:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/eco-nomics/2012/09/25/self-driving-cars-will-
take-over-by-2040/ (noting that approximately ten billion dollars was spent in 2011 on 
“advanced driver assistance systems” and that is expected to grow to as much as $130 
billion by 2016).  
 
50 Newcomb, supra note 14; Emerging Technology: Driving Safety, Efficiency and 
Independence, GEN. MOTORS, 
http://www.gm.com/vision/design_technology/emerging_technology.html (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2013). 
 
51 Newcomb, supra note 14. 
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biggest hurdles in the transition from traditional automobiles to AVs.52  
Some drivers simply enjoy driving and will not want to give that up; 
others may be afraid to relinquish control of their vehicle to a computer.53  
Regardless of the hurdles, AVs are coming. With the AV technology 
rapidly developing, the legal field needs to respond. 
 
B.  AVs and the Law 
 
[12] Currently, the law lags behind the development of AVs.54  As of 
October 2012, only three states—Nevada, Florida, and California—had 
enacted legislation regarding AVs.55  California, the state where Google is 
based, was the last of the three to pass legislation.56   Of those three, only 
Nevada has passed detailed regulations regarding the use, licensing, and 
testing of AVs.57  Technically, AVs were not explicitly prohibited in these 
states even before the legislation,58 but Google is encouraging lawmakers 
                                                 
52 See Motavalli, supra note 49. 
 
53 See id.; Newcomb, supra note 14.  
 
54 See The Future of Driving, supra note 14, at 10:08:16-10:09:24. 
 
55 See CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West Supp. 2013); FLA. STAT. §§ 316.85-316.86, 
319.145 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.100 (2013).  Michigan is currently considering 
similar legislation, which is expected to pass soon.  David Shepardson, Snyder Wants 
State to Be Leader for Emerging Automated Technology, DENVER POST (Feb. 15, 2013, 
11:58 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/auto/news/ci_22599372.  Colorado, on the other 
hand, rejected a proposal to legalize AVs.  Colorado Rejects Driverless Car Proposal, 
CBS DENVER (Feb. 5, 2013, 6:12 PM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2013/02/05/colorado-
rejects-driverless-car-proposal/.  
 
56 Claire Cain Miller, With a Push from Google, California Legalizes Driverless Cars, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/with-a-
push-from-google-california-legalizes-driverless-cars/.  See generally VEH. § 38750. 
 
57 See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
 
58 See The Future of Driving, supra note 14, at 10:13:18; see also Miller, supra note 56.  
Additionally, the California Vehicle Code simply defines a motor vehicle as “a vehicle 
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to create legislation and regulations to legitimize the technology and to 
ensure the development and use of the technology is done safely by other 
manufacturers.59  
 
1.  Nevada Pioneers AV Regulation 
 
[13] In early 2012, Nevada became the first state to pass legislation and 
regulation regarding autonomous vehicles.60  Effective March 1, 2012, 
Nevada passed enabling legislation authorizing the Nevada Department of 
Motor Vehicles (DMV) to regulate AVs.61  Among other things, the 
legislation gave the DMV authority to regulate the operation, minimum 
safety standards, and testing requirements for AVs.62  The Nevada DMV 
regulation, also adopted March 1, 2012, establishes several important 
policies.63  First, the regulation defines more specifically what constitutes 
an AV by explaining what kind of technology is not covered under this 
                                                                                                                         
that it self-propelled,” which would include an AV.  VEH. § 415.  Similarly, the provision 
for unlawful operation does not suggest an AV would be prohibited.  See id. § 24002.  
Likewise, Nevada defines a motor vehicle as one that is self-propelled and can be used on 
a public highway.  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 482.075, 482.135.  Florida uses a similar 
definition.  See FLA. STAT. § 316.003(21).  The Florida law does, however, suggest some 
problem for AVs absent the enabling legislation since it requires an operator be 
physically in control of the vehicle.  See id. § 316.003(25).  A physically present operator 
of an AV could be considered “in actual physical control” of the vehicle since the 
operator could take over at any time.  Id.  The current enabling legislation requires a 
physically present operator and someone to engage and disengage the technology, so 
arguably this provision would not have acted to prohibit AVs absent the enabling 
legislation.  See id. §§ 316.85, 316.86, 319.145.  
 
59 The Future of Driving, supra note 14, at 10:09:24-10:10:22. 
 
60 Compare VEH. § 38750, and FLA. STAT. §§ 316.85, 316.86, 319.145, with NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 482A.100. 
 
61 NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.100. 
 
62 Id. 
 
63 See generally NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A (2012). 
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regulation.64  Specifically, the regulation states that “vehicle[s] enabled 
with a safety system or driver assistance system” are not classified as AVs 
unless the system can operate without a driver monitoring it.65  
Additionally, the regulation states that whoever engages the vehicle will 
be considered the “operator,” whether or not the operator is in the vehicle 
while it is engaged.66  Likewise, the operator is considered the “driver” for 
enforcement of traffic laws and similar motor vehicle laws.67  During 
testing, however, the regulation requires two people to be in the vehicle, 
including one who is able to “take complete control of the vehicle” if 
necessary.68  Further, this regulation essentially establishes liability for 
accidents.69  Lastly, Nevada has added a legislation making it legal to text 
while operating an AV.70   
                                                 
64 See id. 
 
65 Id. § 482A.010.  The regulation specifically states that “electronic blind spot 
assistance, crash avoidance, emergency braking, parking assistance, adaptive cruise 
control, lane keep assistance, lane departure warnings and traffic jams and queuing 
assistance” are not included under this regulation.  Id. 
 
66 Id. § 482A.020.  This provision suggests AVs will be able to be operated without a 
physically present operator.  
 
67 Id. § 482A.030. 
 
68 NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.130(1). 
 
69 Presumably this would enable the current insurance law to apply to autonomous 
vehicles regardless of the presence of the operator at the time of the accident.  But see 
John Markoff, Collision in the Making Between Self-Driving Cars and How the World 
Works, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/technology/googles-autonomous-vehicles-draw-
skepticism-at-legal-symposium.html?_r=0 (stating that insurance regulation for 
autonomous vehicles has yet to be addressed).  
 
70 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 484B.165(1)(a), (7) (2013).  This further suggests how little, if at 
all, the driver will need to be involved in the operation of the vehicle.  
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2.  Florida Follows the Leader 
 
[14] In July 2012, Florida enacted legislation similar to the legislation 
in Nevada.71  This statute provides a definition of “autonomous vehicle” 
that is almost identical to the Nevada statute.72  This statute differs, 
though, in that it does not require operators to have special endorsements; 
a valid driver’s license is all that is necessary to operate a vehicle in 
autonomous mode.73  The Florida law also provides immunity for the 
original manufacturer if a third party equips a vehicle with autonomous 
technology.74 
 
3.  California Catches Up 
 
[15] On September 25, 2012, at Google’s headquarters, California’s 
Governor Jerry Brown signed legislation initiated by Senator Alex Padilla 
to authorize the use of AVs in California.75   California defines an AV as 
any vehicle that “has the capability to drive . . . without the active physical 
control or monitoring by a human operator,”76 but does not include 
vehicles that only have collision avoidance systems.77  Similar to the 
Nevada regulation,78 the “operator” is anyone who engages the vehicle or 
                                                 
71 FLA. STAT. §§ 316.85-16.86, 319.145 (2013); accord NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A. 
 
72 Compare FLA. STAT. § 319.145, with NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.080. 
 
73 See FLA. STAT. § 316.85. 
 
74 Id. § 316.86(2). 
 
75 Damon Lavrinc, Autonomous Vehicles Now Legal in California, WIRED (Sept. 25, 
2012, 4:30 PM), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/09/sb1298-signed-governor/. 
 
76 CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(a)(1)-(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2013). 
 
77 VEH. § 38750(a)(2)(B).  These include systems like blind spot assistance, automated 
emergency braking systems and lane departure warning systems.  Id. 
 
78 NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.020 (2012). 
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is in the driver’s seat.79  Another provision explicitly states that “[t]he 
driver shall be seated in the driver’s seat.”80  The rest of the bill is fairly 
similar to the Nevada legislation.81  
 
II.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN A WORLD WITH AVS 
 
[16] With the growing discussion about AVs, many have speculated 
about the potential legal and social effects likely to result.82  Much of the 
current discussion revolves around liability, either for the manufacturers or 
for the operators of AVs.83  Additionally, there is potential for Google and 
similar companies to use the information gained from the “black-box”84 
                                                 
79 VEH. § 38750(a)(4). 
 
80 Id. § 38750(b)(2).  While this provision states that the law is not intended to allow for 
AVs to be operated without the physical presence of a driver, section 38750(a)(4) 
suggests it is only a matter of time before operation without a physically present driver 
will be permissible.  See id. § 38750(a)(4).  Further, the statute states that the Department 
of Motor Vehicles may impose additional requirements on a party seeking approval to 
operate an AV without a physically present driver, suggesting this will be a possibility in 
the future.  See id. § 38750(e)(2). 
 
81 Compare id. § 38750, with discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 
82 See generally Robert Peterson, New Technology–Old Law: Autonomous Vehicles and 
California’s Insurance Framework, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1341 (2012) (discussing 
the effect AVs will have on the California insurance industry); Andrew P. Garza, Note, 
“Look Ma, No Hands!”: Wrinkles and Wrecks in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 46 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 581 (2011) (discussing the impact AVs may have on products liability 
law); Susan Vogel, Driving the Future, SANTA CLARA L. MAG., 
http://law.scu.edu/sclaw/spring-2012-driving-the-future.cfm (last visited Oct. 2, 2013) 
(exploring liability, insurance, criminal tampering, and social challenges of autonomous 
vehicles). 
 
83 See generally Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal Liability Issues 
Created by Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157 (2012); Peterson, 
supra note 82; Garza, supra note 82. 
 
84 The Senate has recently passed a bill requiring Event Data Recorders or “black boxes” 
in every car.  See S. 1813, 112th Cong. § 31406 (2012).  The black box tracks the 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 1 
 
 16 
for advertising purposes.85  What has scarcely been mentioned, however, 
is the impact AVs might have on law enforcement activity under the 
Fourth Amendment with regards to drug-interdiction stops.86  To see more 
clearly how AVs may change Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is 
helpful first to look at Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as it currently 
stands.  
 
A.  The Fourth Amendment and Automobiles 
 
[17] The Fourth Amendment provides safeguards for the public against 
unreasonable government intrusion.87  Typically, courts have required 
                                                                                                                         
movements of the operators which could then be used to obtain information about what 
advertising would be relevant for the AV operator.  
 
85 Cf. Sarah Mitroff, Senate Passes Bill Requiring “Black Boxes” for Cars, But You May 
Already Have One, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 19, 2012, 3:14 PM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2012/04/19/black-boxes-for-cars/ (discussing black boxes and 
privacy concerns). 
 
86 See, e.g., Whorf, supra note 2 (explaining the process of drug-interdiction stops).  See 
generally Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1171 (2012) (discussing the various privacy concerns with regard to AVs beyond just the 
Fourth Amendment).  
 
87 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The amendment reads:  
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
Id.  Daniel R. Dinger and John S. Dinger explain that “[a]t the time of its ratification, the 
Fourth Amendment’s primary purpose was to protect ‘against the utilization of the ‘writs 
of assistance’’ by the British.  Over the years, however, it has evolved into an important 
part of every citizen’s procedural rights against government intrusion into personal 
affairs.”  Daniel R. Dinger & John S. Dinger, Deceptive Drug Checkpoints and 
Individual Suspicion: Can Law Enforcement Really Deceive Its Way into a Drug 
Trafficking Conviction?, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (quoting THE CONSTITUTION OF 
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officers to secure a warrant from a neutral magistrate prior to entering a 
home or conducting a search,88 though the Supreme Court has stated that a 
warrant is not required for all searches.89  The Court has often reiterated 
that one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in a home is much greater 
than one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile.90  Unlike 
homes, automobiles are subject to immense government regulation 
because they operate on public roads and their interiors are more visible to 
the public.91  Nearly a century ago, the Court specifically addressed the 
differences between the home and an automobile under the Fourth 
Amendment in Carroll v. United States.92  In Carroll, officers suspected 
the petitioners of transporting alcohol,93 and consequently stopped them 
and searched their vehicle.94  The Court held that even in the absence of a 
valid search warrant, the police may make a search and seizure so long as 
they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle was being used to 
commit a crime.95  The decision in Carroll introduced the Court’s 
                                                                                                                         
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1199-1200 (Johnny 
H. Killian & George A. Constello eds., 1996)). 
 
88 See United States v. Martinez, 686 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1179 (D.N.M. 2009). 
 
89 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146 (1925). 
 
90 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 153-54, 154 n.2 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976).  
 
91 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 154 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).  
 
92 267 U.S. at 153. 
 
93 During this time, the transportation of alcohol was prohibited by the Eighteenth 
Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
 
94 267 U.S. at 163 (McReynolds, J., concurring). 
 
95 Id. at 156.  The Court explained that “the seizing officer shall have reasonable or 
probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has 
contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported. . . . In cases where the 
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reluctance to equate the privacy afforded in the home and the privacy 
afforded in an automobile.96  Moreover, it gave the police greater 
authority to conduct searches of automobiles by eliminating the need for a 
neutral third party to verify that the officer had probable cause prior to the 
search.97  
 
B.  Challenging a Stop or Seizure 
 
[18] Before looking at the different ways in which the police may 
currently stop and search an automobile, it is essential to have a basic 
understanding of who may make a Fourth Amendment challenge.  The 
Court generally finds that an individual has standing to raise a Fourth 
Amendment challenge either when she has been seized98 or when she has 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area or item searched.99  To 
                                                                                                                         
securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, [however,] it must be used.”  Id.; see also 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-95 (1985) (holding that a warrantless search of a 
motor home based on probable cause was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 
96 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.  
 
97 See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154 (abandoning the warrant requirement for a search of an 
automobile based on probable cause). 
 
98 See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007) (holding that police seizure of a 
passenger of a stopped automobile implicated the Fourth Amendment); Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (stating that “stopping an automobile and detaining its 
occupants constitute[s] a ‘seizure’”).  
 
99 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87-88, 91 (1998) (using an apartment simply to 
package cocaine does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy); Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (explaining that the defendant did not have a property interest 
in the item seized and failed to show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car in 
which he was a passenger).  In Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan outlined a two part 
test that is still being used by the courts.  389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (explaining that a person must have both an expectation of privacy, and that 
expectation must be “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).  The 
First Circuit Court of Appeals has even refused to permit a passenger seized during a 
traffic stop to challenge the constitutionality of a search because the passenger did not 
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determine whether a seizure has occurred, the Court generally looks at the 
totality of the circumstances to see if a reasonable person would feel free 
to leave.100  In some cases, a person may not feel free to leave for reasons 
other than police presence, so the “free to leave” test is not appropriate in 
all circumstances.101  In those situations, the Court looks instead at 
whether “a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ 
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.”102  Importantly, not every 
encounter between the police and an individual amounts to a seizure or 
stop under the Fourth Amendment.103  For example, a casual encounter 
                                                                                                                         
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched.  United States v. 
Symonevich, 688 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2012).  So, a person seized may challenge the 
constitutionality of the seizure, but not the search unless the person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the place to be searched.  See id. at 19.  
 
100 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (“We adhere to the view 
that a person is ‘seized’ only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his 
freedom of movement is restrained.”); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 
626 (1991) (holding that the suspect was not seized when he ignored the officer’s show 
of authority and continued running); United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 690-92 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that the defendant was seized when officers in a marked car 
demanded he “stop” and “stay right there”). 
 
101 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1991) (explaining that in a situation 
where the person does not intend to leave, determining whether a reasonable person 
would feel free to leave would not be an adequate test).  
 
102 Id. at 436.  In Bostick, officers boarded a bus on which the defendant was traveling 
and requested to search the defendant’s luggage.  Id. at 431-32.  The Court determined 
that he undoubtedly did not feel free to leave because he would ultimately be sacrificing 
his luggage and bus ticket.  Id. at 435-36.  Thus, the Court found it inappropriate to apply 
the free-to-leave test.  Id. at 436.  Still, the key for courts is to inquire into the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the event.  Id. at 437; see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 
210, 216, 219 (1984) (explaining that the Court should inquire into a reasonable person’s 
freedom to decline an officers’ request when immigration officials question employees at 
their workplace).  
 
103 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). 
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with the police does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections.104  
Still, the Court has been clear that when the police stop a vehicle, the 
driver is seized and entitled to the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.105  
 
C.  Stops and Subsequent Searches 
 
[19] In Carroll, the Court dealt with the validity of the search of the 
vehicle, not with the stop that preceded the search.106  In general, probable 
cause is necessary to search a vehicle once it has been stopped, but 
reasonable suspicion is all that is needed to initially stop a vehicle.107 
 
 
                                                 
104 See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011) (“[O]fficers may seek consent-
based encounters if they are lawfully present in the place where the consensual encounter 
occurs.”); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (suggesting that drug-interdiction efforts do not 
always implicate the Fourth Amendment); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) 
(explaining that the Fourth Amendment is not violated simply by an officer approaching 
a person and asking her questions); see also infra note 109 and accompanying text 
(discussing the three different kinds of police encounters). 
 
105 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007).  The Court in Brendlin explains that 
“[a] person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government’s action 
under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, ‘by means of physical force or authority,’ 
terminates or restrains his freedom of movement.”  Id. at 254 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. 
at 434).  For the purpose of this note, it is sufficient to understand that one is seized and 
the Fourth Amendment is implicated simply by an officer stopping the vehicle.  See, e.g., 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (explaining that a checkpoint 
constitutes a seizure); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (explaining that the 
Fourth Amendment is implicated “because stopping an automobile and detaining its 
occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ . . . even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention quite brief.”) (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 
878 (1975)); see also Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 257 (holding that a passenger is seized when 
the vehicle in which he is riding is stopped).  
 
106 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
 
107 See generally United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (holding that a stop of a 
vehicle based on reasonable suspicion is permissible). 
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1.  Reasonable Suspicion Stops 
 
[20] Even though a stop of an automobile implicates the Fourth 
Amendment, in some instances reasonable suspicion, a lesser standard 
than probable cause, is all the police need in the absence of a warrant.108  
The Court has classified police encounters in three different ways: casual 
encounters, Terry stops, and arrests.109  As the Court held in Terry v. 
Ohio,110 when an officer reasonably believes that “criminal activity may 
be afoot,” the officer may make a reasonable inquiry to protect himself 
and those around him.111  Any action taken by the officer must be 
                                                 
108 See, e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1, 8 (1968). 
 
109 United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300, 1312 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that there are 
three kinds of police-citizen encounters, (1) consensual encounters not based on any level 
of suspicion, (2) stops under Terry, and (3) arrests).  Unless otherwise noted, the term 
“stop” throughout the rest of this note refers to a stop based on reasonable suspicion or 
what have also been classified as Terry stops. 
  
110 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 
111 Id. at 30.  More specifically the court held that 
 
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity 
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be 
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating 
this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes 
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial steps of the 
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ 
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area 
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such 
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to 
assault him.  
 
Id.  In this case, Officer McFadden observed two men acting in what he considered to be 
an odd way.  Id. at 5.  He explained that one man would leave the other, stop by a store to 
look in the window, then walk a few more steps, turn and walk past again, pausing at the 
same store.  Id. at 6.  McFadden noted that these two men took turns walking past the 
store several times each.  Id. at 6.  Suspecting the men to be casing the store, he stopped 
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reasonable based on the circumstances and limited in scope.112  
Reasonable suspicion and the subsequent seizure “must be based on 
specific, objective facts”113 that give the officer “a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting” the person stopped was engaging in 
criminal activity.114  Courts apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test to 
determine if the reasonable suspicion requirement is satisfied.115  
Additionally, facts that might individually suggest innocent behavior may 
amount to reasonable suspicion when aggregated.116  Thus, since the 
                                                                                                                         
the men, asked their names, and then patted them down.  See id. at 6-7.  Officer 
McFadden found a gun on two of the men, and they were both charged with carrying a 
concealed weapon.  Id. at 7.  Agreeing that Officer McFadden did not have probable 
cause to stop and frisk the two men, the Court nonetheless held that the officer’s actions 
were not a violation of the Fourth Amendment since the seizure and the pat down were 
reasonable and limited in scope.  See id. at 19-20, 30.  The initial rule was more focused 
on police protection when police encounter individuals on the street, but has been 
expanded to include traffic stops.  See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text. 
 
112 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20. 
 
113 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). 
 
114 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).  The Supreme Court has also 
found that “some investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion of past criminal 
activity could withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”  United States v. Hensley, 469 
U.S. 221, 227 (1985).  Whether this requirement is actually used in practice is another 
issue.  David A. Harris suggests that while the Court reiterates this requirement, it does 
not actually require it.  David A. Harris, Terry and the Fourth Amendment: 
Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower 
Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 976 (1998) (“Even 
though the Court’s rhetoric concerning the requirement of particularized suspicion stands, 
almost unchanged, since 1968, lower courts have gradually but unmistakably eroded the 
force of these words.”). 
 
115 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 692 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); United States v. McCauley, 548 F.3d 440, 
443 (6th Cir. 2008)).   
 
116 See, e.g., United States v. Neff, 681 F.3d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989)) (“While certain facts, taken in isolation, may be 
‘quite consistent with innocent travel,’ these facts may, in the aggregate, add up to 
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inquiry is so heavily dependent on the specific facts of the case, there is no 
clear set of rules that a court can apply to determine whether reasonable 
suspicion is present in any given case.117 
 
[21] A decade after Terry, the Court held that stops of automobiles in 
particular are unreasonable absent articulable reasonable suspicion that 
there has been some violation of the law.118  In Delaware v. Prouse, an 
officer stopped the respondent’s vehicle simply to check his driver’s 
license and registration; the officer lacked both probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion to make the stop.119  The Court recognized that 
government interests may justify an intrusion on privacy, so the Court 
must carefully balance the government’s interest in making stops with the 
individual’s privacy interest.120  Even though individuals are entitled to a 
                                                                                                                         
reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that behavior “susceptible to an innocent explanation when isolated from its 
context may still give rise to reasonable suspicion when considered in light of all the 
factors”). 
 
117 See, e.g., Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)); see also infra notes 125-30 
and accompanying text.  
 
118 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); cf. State v. Butler, 539 S.E.2d 414, 416 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the police lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion to 
stop based solely on the presence of a paper temporary license plate on the vehicle).  
 
119 See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (affirming defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of 
marijuana possession because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop 
defendant’s vehicle).  
 
120 Id. at 656-57 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975)); 
see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (“We must balance the nature 
and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the 
importance of governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”); State v. Rissley, 
824 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that the court “balances the 
interests of the State in detecting, preventing, and investigating crime and the rights of 
individuals to be free from unreasonable intrusions”) (quoting State v. Post, 733 N.W.2d 
634, 638 (Wis. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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lesser protection in automobiles than in homes,121 the Court stressed that 
individuals “operating or traveling in an automobile [do] not lose all 
reasonable expectation of privacy . . . .”122  Because the government can 
achieve the same interest served by allowing stops to check for driver’s 
licenses by making stops for observed violations, the Court held that the 
government interest here did not justify the intrusion.123 
 
[22] What actually constitutes reasonable suspicion, upon which 
officers can stop an automobile, is more difficult to understand.  In United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Court held that border patrol agents’ stops 
based solely on the apparent ancestry of the occupants of the vehicle were 
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.124 The Brignoni-Ponce 
Court outlined several factors that officers can take into account when 
establishing reasonable suspicion, including: the characteristics of the 
area, the proximity to the border, normal traffic patterns on a given road, 
the driver’s and occupant’s behavior, features of the vehicle,125 and the 
                                                 
121 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 
122 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662. 
 
123 Id. at 659-61; cf. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882-83 (finding that the government’s 
interest in limiting illegal immigration did not justify the use of roving patrols to make 
stops based upon the apparent ethnicity of the occupants); infra notes 124-27 and 
accompanying text. 
 
124 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-86 (finding that the respondents were stopped 
because officers believed them to be illegal aliens based solely on “apparent Mexican 
ancestry”); cf. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“The likelihood that in an area in which the majority—or even a substantial part—of the 
population is Hispanic, any given person of Hispanic ancestry is in fact an alien, let alone 
an illegal alien, is not high enough to make Hispanic appearance a relevant factor in the 
reasonable suspicion calculus.”). 
 
125 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-85.  The Court gave the example of a station wagon 
with compartments that can be used to transport aliens or an unusually heavy load.  Id. at 
885; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277-78 (2002) (applying all of these 
factors to conclude the agent had reasonable suspicion to make the stop). 
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appearance of the occupants,126 but not simply one’s race or ethnicity.127  
The totality-of-the-circumstances test enables courts and officers to use 
their past experiences to infer that criminal activity may be afoot by 
analyzing these and other factors present at the time of the stop or present 
during prior investigations.128 
 
                                                 
126 The Court noted that “officers can recognize characteristic appearance of persons who 
live in Mexico, relying on such factors as mode of dress and haircut.”  Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. at 885.  This seems to be a distinction without a difference.  The Court 
essentially just re-characterized the factor to make it sound more politically correct.  
 
127 Id. at 884-86.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also held that in general one’s 
Hispanic appearance cannot be considered for reasonable suspicion.  Montero-Camargo, 
208 F.3d at 1132. 
 
128 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (explaining that “[t]his process allows officers to draw on their 
own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about 
the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person’” 
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981))).  Additionally, in United 
States v. Johnson, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals methodically listed the factors it 
took into account in determining that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion.  United 
States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 692 (6th Cir. 2010).  The court explained that the 
following factors were present at the time of the stop: 
 
(1) Johnson was in a high drug-trafficking area; (2) it was 4:00 a.m.; (3) 
the officers were responding to a 911 call; (4) two or three minutes 
after the 911 call, the officers observed Johnson twenty to thirty yards 
from the blue Cadillac referenced in the call and near the residence 
from which the call was made; (5) the officers did not notice anyone 
else in the area, besides the driver of the white car to which Johnson 
was headed; (6) Johnson did not stop when called to by the officers and 
instead continued walking toward the white car; and (7) he was 
carrying a bag, which he threw into the white car. 
 
Id. at 692.  The court went into a lengthy discussion about why it did not believe these 
factors established reasonable suspicion, ultimately determining that “[t]he facts involved 
here fall short of the constitutional standard.”  Id. at 696.  On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court in Arvizu determined that the officer’s inference based on observable facts was 
sufficient for reasonable suspicion.  Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277.  
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2.  Probable Cause to Search 
 
[23] Once a vehicle has been stopped based either on probable cause129 
or reasonable suspicion, officers must have probable cause in order to 
conduct a search.130  Probable cause is more than a “bare suspicion” that a 
crime has been committed.131  The traditional view is that probable cause 
is established “[i]f the facts and circumstances before the officer are such 
to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offence has 
                                                 
129 Stops based on probable cause are not Terry stops.  Still, officers can stop based on 
probable cause because the lower standard of reasonable suspicion will, by definition, be 
satisfied.  
 
130 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1975) (“[W]e see no difference between on 
the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a 
magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.  
Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.”).  In addition to stops based on reasonable suspicion, the police can pull 
over automobiles based on probable cause.  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-
56 (1925).  Probable cause can be established simply by a driver breaking a traffic law.  
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (holding that stops are 
reasonable if an officer has probable cause to believe the driver violated a traffic law); 
State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659, 668 (Neb. 2006) (“[A] traffic violation, no matter 
how minor, creates probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.”); People v. 
Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 642 (N.Y. 2001) (noting that an officer who has probable 
cause to believe that a traffic violation has been committed may make a stop).  
Establishing probable cause can sometimes be more certain than reasonable suspicion.  In 
most cases, officers stop vehicles following a traffic violation.  Any traffic violation 
establishes probable cause since a law has actually been broken.  Thus, in most instances, 
police can be more certain the stop will hold up if there is a traffic violation.  Similarly, 
because the standard for probable cause is higher than that for reasonable suspicion, if an 
officer believes probable cause has been established, it is almost certain that she has 
reasonable suspicion, so the stop should hold up.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 
(1968) (explaining that reasonable suspicion can be established despite a lack of probable 
cause).  There are, however, several exceptions that allow officers to get into vehicles 
absent probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found therein.  See infra 
notes 140-43 and accompanying text. 
 
131 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
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been committed.”132  As with reasonable suspicion,133 determining 
probable cause is highly dependent on the facts, and the Court has avoided 
issuing set rules on how it must be established.134  Probable cause to 
search is often based upon an officer sensing something when she 
approaches the vehicle,135 which then gives the officer some level of the 
individualized suspicion required for a search to be reasonable.136 
 
[24] An initial stop based on reasonable suspicion can lead to a search 
of the automobile based on probable cause.137  Nevertheless, even if the 
initial stop is based on probable cause after the driver was observed 
                                                 
132 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 161.  
 
133 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 
134 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (“[P]robable cause is a fluid 
concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not 
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”). 
 
135 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (explaining that probable 
cause was established when the officer smelled burning opium); United States v. West, 
219 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that probable cause to search a bag in the 
trunk of a vehicle was established after the officer smelled methamphetamine); Minnick 
v. United States, 607 A.2d 519, 525 (D.C. 1992) (holding that an officer established 
probable cause to search when he smelled a scent he associated with PCP).  
 
136 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (“A search or 
seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing.” (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997))); Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that stopping a vehicle without reasonable suspicion is 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment).  The Court has recognized only limited situations 
where this general rule does not apply.  See, e.g., Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (allowing random drug testing of student-athletes); Nat’l Treasury 
Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (allowing drug tests for some customs 
officials). 
 
137 See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235-36 (1985) (explaining that the 
stopping officer had reasonable suspicion based on a wanted flyer from another police 
department, and that the subsequent search was based on probable cause after the officers 
saw a gun in plain view).  
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breaking a traffic law, the officer must further establish probable cause 
that there is evidence of a crime in the vehicle before he can search.138  
This general rule is subject to several exceptions that allow officers to get 
into vehicles for limited purposes without probable cause.139  Courts have 
permitted a limited search to determine ownership of a vehicle140 or to 
ensure the officer’s safety.141  Similarly, the Court has validated searches 
                                                 
138 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009) (“A rule that gives police the power to 
conduct such a search whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic offense, 
when there is no basis for believing evidence of the offense might be found in the 
vehicle, creates a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals.”); 
see also State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659, 668-69 (Neb. 2006).  In Voichahoske, an 
officer stopped the vehicle for speeding.  Id.  Following the stop, the court found that the 
officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop to continue investigating based on 
the occupants behavior and lack of registration.  Id. at 668-69.  The officer summoned a 
drug dog, and the dog alerted to the vehicle providing probable cause to search the 
vehicle.  See id. at 670-71.  Thus, probable cause to search had to be established 
independent of the probable cause to stop.  
 
139 See Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d at 670 (“The warrantless search exceptions recognized 
by this court include: (1) searches undertaken with consent or probable cause, (2) 
searches under exigent circumstances, (3) inventory searches, (4) searches of evidence in 
plain view, and (5) searches incident to a valid arrest.”). 
 
140 See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 235 (1968); United States v. Ferri, 357 
F. Supp. 487, 490 (W.D. Wis. 1973).  The court in United States v. Lopez determined that 
“at a minimum, an inquiry should be made by the officers as to the whereabouts of the 
registration prior to the entry.”  474 F. Supp. 943, 948 (C.D. Cal. 1979).  By comparison, 
in Paschall v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court validated the search of a gym bag to find 
the vehicle registration despite no further inquiry by the officer about the possible 
location of the registration.  523 N.E.2d 1359, 1361-62 (Ind. 1988).  However, the court 
found the subsequent search of a suitcase to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
absent a warrant since the identification exception was no longer applicable.  Id. at 1362. 
 
141 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983) (“The balancing required by Terry 
clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area search of the passenger 
compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they possess an articulable and objectively 
reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.”).  The Court has also 
permitted a limited search of the driver.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 
111-12 (1977) (permitting a search of a driver after the officer noticed a bulge on the 
person); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972) (permitting an officer to reach 
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incident to arrest142 and seizures of items found in plain view.143  Still, a 
further search of the vehicle’s compartments, like the trunk, must be based 
on probable cause to believe contraband will be found therein.144  
Establishing probable cause to conduct a further search and determining 
the scope of that search are dependent on whether the officer has probable 
cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found in the place searched.145  
 
                                                                                                                         
into a vehicle and grab the suspect’s weapon after an informant told the officer where it 
was located). 
 
142 See Gant, 556 U.S. at 335.  Searches incident to arrest must be limited in scope.  Id. 
(holding that officer can search incident to arrest so long as they reasonably believe 
“evidence of the offense of [the] arrest might be found in the vehicle”); see also United 
States v. Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 
143 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-69 (1971) (permitting the police 
to seize an item found in plain view so long as the discovery was inadvertent). 
 
144 See Jackson, 415 F.3d at 91.  Once an officer may search the trunk, though, that 
officer may search any containers inside the trunk.  Id. at 91-92; see also United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). 
 
145 See Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 (explaining that the scope of a warrantless automobile 
search is limited by “the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be 
found,” rather than by “the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted”); 
see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1982) (holding that police may 
conduct warrantless searches of containers in automobiles so long as they have probable 
cause to believe contraband will be contained therein).  Establishing probable cause to 
search both a container or the trunk and the passenger compartment is dependent on the 
likelihood that evidence of the crime would be found in the container or the trunk.  See 
Jackson, 415 F.3d at 91-93 (rejecting the government’s argument that the officers had 
probable cause to search for contraband in the trunk because they found stolen tags on the 
outside of the vehicle).  The Jackson court differentiated that case from other cases where 
there were more “empirical connection[s]” between discovery in the passenger 
compartment and the presence of additional contraband in the trunk.  Id. at 93 (citing 
United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. 
Turner, 119 F.3d 18, 20-21 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (permitting the search of the trunk after the 
officer established probable cause that marijuana was contained in the vehicle and could 
be contained in the trunk). 
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D.  Consent to Search 
 
[25] Officers can avoid establishing probable cause to search if they can 
obtain valid consent to search.146  A warrantless entry and search of an 
automobile, or even a home, does not violate the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures147 as long as the 
officer obtains the consent of the owner whose property is to be searched 
prior to conducting the search.148  If the owner is not present, a third party 
who has access to the area149 and “common authority over or other 
sufficient relationship to the premises” may give valid consent to a 
search.150  Any consent given, though, must be free and voluntary.151  
                                                 
146 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).  See generally Tracey 
Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 27 (2008) (discussing consent searches); Whorf, supra note 2. 
 
147 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 
148 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248; 
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946). 
 
149 See United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1992) (permitting the owner of 
the locker in which the defendant had stored items to consent to a search). 
 
150 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). The Court explained that 
common authority depends on the  
 
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or 
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any 
of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection . . . and that 
the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit 
the common area to be searched. 
 
Id. at 172 n.7. 
 
151 See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002); Ohio v. Robinette, 
519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (holding that officers do not need to tell the detainee that he or 
she is “free to go” before his consent to search is recognized); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
222 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)) (explaining that the 
prosecution has the burden of establishing consent was “freely and voluntarily given”).  
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Additionally, the consent of a third party who in fact does not possess 
authority to consent is valid as long as the officers reasonably believe the 
person has authority to consent.152  Lastly, the validity of a minor’s 
consent is still being debated in the courts, but courts have held that the 
Fourth Amendment protections apply to minors.153  The Supreme Court 
has yet to decide the issue of minor consent to search automobiles, but 
some lower courts have found that minors have authority to consent to 
searches, at least it some circumstances.154  In any case, the request for 
consent cannot delay the stop itself.155  Some courts have further limited 
the scope of consent inquiries, holding that it must be related to the traffic 
                                                                                                                         
The Court determines voluntariness based on the totality of the circumstances to ensure 
the consent was not the “product of duress or coercion.”  Id. at 227.  The Court noted that 
it is not necessary for police to inform a party of his or her right to refuse consent, though 
such knowledge can be taken into account.  Id.  Lastly, the Court noted a need to balance 
the “legitimate need for such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring 
the absence of coercion.”  Id.  Additionally, consent must be more than just acquiescence 
to a lawful authority.  Id. at 233; see also United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 
727 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 
152 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89; Maclin, supra note 146, at 43-44. 
 
153 See, e.g., Abdella v. O’Toole, 343 F. Supp. 2d 129, 135, 137 (D. Conn. 2004) (noting 
that a minor’s authority to consent has not been decided, but courts should consider the 
possibility that minor may be more easily coerced); Kristin Henning, The Fourth 
Amendment Rights of Children at Home: When Parental Authority Goes Too Far, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 55, 61 (2011). 
 
154 E.g., Lenz v. Winburm, 51 F.3d 1540, 1545, 1548-49 (11th Cir. 1995) (permitting a 
minor to consent to a GAL search of a bedroom); United States v. Clutter, 914 F.2d 775, 
778 (6th Cir. 1990) (permitting the defendant’s fourteen and twelve-year-old children to 
consent to a search of their home).  Contra United States v. Barkovitz, 29 F. Supp. 2d 
411, 415-16 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (finding the twelve-year-old son of the defendant lacked 
authority to consent to a search of the father’s bedroom); People v. Jacobs, 729 P.2d 757, 
759 (Cal. 1987) (holding that an eleven-year-old’s consent to search the child’s home was 
invalid); State v. Schwarz, 136 P.3d 989, 992 (Mont. 2006) (invalidating a search 
pursuant to a thirteen-year-old’s consent to search the child’s home).  
 
155 See State v. Johnson, 51 P.3d 1112, 1116-17 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002). 
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stop and supported by some kind of reasonable suspicion.156  Consent 
nevertheless gets officers into many vehicles, but the process may be 
affected by AVs in the future. 
 
III.  SO WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR AVS? 
 
[26] According to the Department of Justice, people most often 
encounter the police during traffic stops.157  Professor Wayne R. LaFave 
explains that since drivers cannot travel a significant distance without 
breaking some traffic law, “virtually anyone (even a Supreme Court 
Justice) can readily be stopped” based on probable cause.158  AVs, 
however, can do just that; AVs are designed to abide by all traffic laws.  
Thus, the ability of the police to stop just anyone will presumably be 
significantly lessened with the introduction of AVs into our society.  For 
the most part, current AV regulation does not allow for vehicles to be 
operated without a physically present operator,159 but the text of the 
legislation and reports from the industry suggest that the goal is to have 
AVs be fully operational without a physically present operator.160  Thus, 
the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to AVs, both with and without 
                                                 
156 See State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418-19 (Minn. 2003). 
 
157 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Traffic Stops, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=702.  
 
158 Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much 
“Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1853 (2004) 
(citing B. James George, Jr., CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
CASES 65 (1969)). 
 
159 See supra notes 68, 81, and accompanying text.  But see NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 
482A.030 (2012) (permitting the operation of AVs without an operator being physically 
present only if a certificate of compliance has been issued). 
 
160 See Nissan Motor Company, Nissan Announces Unprecedented Autonomous Drive 
Benchmarks, NISSANNEWS (Aug. 27, 2013), http://nissannews.com/en-
US/nissan/usa/releases/nissan-announces-unprecedented-autonomous-drive-benchmarks; 
supra notes 66, 76, 80, and accompanying text. 
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a physically present operator, will likely be at the forefront of debate 
within the next several years.  
 
A.  Reasonable Suspicion and Probable Cause when AVs Rule 
the Road 
 
[27] Establishing reasonable suspicion to stop an AV may be more 
difficult than establishing reasonable suspicion to stop a traditional 
vehicle.  Reasonable suspicion is generally found in one of three ways.  
The first is by prior extrinsic observation, meaning officers conduct an 
outside investigation that increases their suspicion of a certain individual 
and vehicle without necessarily relying on the behavior of the individual at 
the time of the stop.161  The second way reasonable suspicion can be found 
is by receiving information from a tipster,162 and the third way is by police 
officers’ observations of the driver at the time of the search.163  The latter 
                                                 
161 See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1981).  This kind of 
observation generally takes place sometime before the stop.  This type of reasonable 
suspicion is typically established based on an outside investigation and is largely 
independent from the observations at the time of the stop.  For example, in Cortez, 
Border Patrol officers found recurring footprints of eight to twenty people in an area near 
the border, with one distinctive set of prints that were always present.  Id. at 413.  Based 
on the path of the prints and the times when they were found, officers deducted that the 
group was traveling at night and on the weekends.  Id.  Based on this information and the 
officers’ experience with illegal immigration in the area, they predicted that a group 
would be coming through on a particular weekend.  Id. at 414.  The officers waited for a 
vehicle that would be capable of transporting a group of aliens and that was driving in the 
pattern they had predicted it would.  Id. at 414-15.  Based on this information, the officers 
stopped the defendant’s vehicle and found the illegal aliens.  Id. at 415.  The Court held 
that the stop was constitutional, stressing the officers’ knowledge of the area and the 
practices of illegal aliens.  Id. at 421-22. 
 
162 See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990); Flemister v. State, 732 S.E.2d 
810, 820 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (determining the reasonable suspicion requirement was 
satisfied based on the officers’ observations following a tip from a confidential 
informant).   
 
163 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 269-71 (2002).  In Arvizu, an officer 
observed a driver on a rural road near the Mexican border where smugglers often try to 
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will not be possible when an AV is operated in autonomous mode without 
a physically present operator for obvious reasons.  However, the first issue 
the Court will likely face is a stop of an AV, operating in autonomous 
mode, with an operator in the vehicle.  Since AVs are designed to abide by 
all relevant traffic laws, the stop will not likely have been based on 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the driver broke a traffic 
law.164  So, as has been done, the officer will have to rely on things like 
the behavior of the operator, the characteristics of the vehicle, the route 
taken by the vehicle, and the area in which the vehicle is located to 
establish reasonable suspicion to make a spontaneous stop, as the Court 
did in United States v. Arvizu.165  The factors relevant to establish 
reasonable suspicion to stop AVs should not be very different from the 
current factors addressed by the courts where reasonable suspicion has 
been found.166  One exception, however, is the officer’s ability to consider 
erratic or unusual driving patterns.  For example, in United States v. 
Baskin, the officer established the requisite reasonable suspicion to make 
                                                                                                                         
avoid permanent checkpoints.  Id. at 269-70.  In addition to the location of the vehicle, 
the officer took into account the driver and passenger’s odd behavior, including the kids’ 
raised knees as if they had something under their feet and their strange waves, in 
determining he had reasonable suspicion to make the stop.  Id. at 270-71, 277-78. 
 
164 See supra Part I.A.  Of course, if a law was broken, the officers would immediately 
have probable cause to make the stop as with a traditional automobile. See United States 
v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994); State v. Lee, 658 N.W.2d 669, 676 
(Neb. 2003) (“It is well established that a traffic violation, no matter how minor, creates 
probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.”).  Similarly, officers will still be able to 
stop for a burned out headlight or other similar maintenance issue.  
 
165 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277; see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-
85 (1975); State v. Cure, 93 So. 3d 1268, 1270 (La. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that 
reasonable suspicion was established based on the defendant’s behavior and the vehicle’s 
location in a high-crime area).  This analysis should not be different from the court’s 
current analysis of reasonable suspicion with automobiles since the officers will be able 
to consider the driver’s behavior.  The issue changes even more when officers are unable 
to take into account a person’s behavior and facial expressions.  
 
166 See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text (discussing the factors appropriate for 
courts to consider). 
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the stop based on the driver’s sudden acceleration upon seeing the officer 
near a meth lab.167  The driver reacted to an outside stimulus, causing him 
to change his method of driving without breaking the law.168  An AV 
operating in autonomous mode will not react to outside stimuli in the way 
the driver in Baskin did, so to that extent officers may have one less factor 
upon which to rely in establishing reasonable suspicion.  It is still possible, 
though, for the driver to disengage autonomous mode.169  In that situation, 
this factor may retain its relevance with regard to AVs with a physically 
present operator.  
 
[28] While that analysis should remain largely unchanged, establishing 
reasonable suspicion to stop an AV operating without a physically present 
driver will be different.  Under these conditions, the officer will have even 
less upon which to establish reasonable suspicion to make the stop, though 
it should still be possible for an officer to develop the requisite 
particularized suspicion using either prior extrinsic observations or 
tipsters.  Obtaining reasonable suspicion through these mechanisms is 
more difficult than traditional drug-interdiction stops.  Currently, many 
drug-interdiction stops are based on observable circumstances 
immediately before the stop.170  Without a physically present operator, the 
police cannot observe the behavior of the operator.  Similarly, when AVs 
are operated in autonomous mode, some other immediate observations like 
                                                 
167 401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005).  
 
168 Id. 
 
169 CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(c)(1)(A), (D) (West 2012); NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 
482A.110(2)(c), 482A.190(2)(b), (g) (2012). 
 
170 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (holding that reasonable 
suspicion was established based on the location of the vehicle and observations of the 
driver and passengers immediately before the stop); United States v. Farnell, 701 F.3d 
256, 262 (8th Cir. 2012) (establishing reasonable suspicion from an officer’s observation 
of a driver who matched the description of a “be on the look-out” report and who 
shielded his face when the officer drove by); Cure, 93 So. 3d at 1270-72 (holding that 
reasonable suspicion was established after the officer observed the behavior of the 
defendant). 
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the route taken or even the neighborhood where the vehicle is being 
operated may be less indicative of criminal activity.171  When the AV 
takes control of the navigation of the vehicle and the route taken, these 
factors may simply be indicative of the programming of the vehicle, rather 
than an indication that criminal activity may be afoot.  That is not to say 
that the location of the vehicle and route taken will become completely 
irrelevant, but the weight given to those factors should be reduced in many 
instances.172  That being the case, police departments may need to increase 
the amount of drug investigations they are conducting in order to maintain 
the number of drug-interdiction stops they make, as they will be more 
reliant on prior extrinsic observation and tipsters. 
 
[29] As a result, the government will quickly request the Court to 
increase its authority to stop AVs because of the government’s heightened 
interest in preventing drug trafficking and its inability to conduct 
additional investigations.  Currently, drug-interdiction stops account for a 
significant amount of drug seizures and drug arrests.173  Routine traffic 
stops allow police to get one step closer to making a formal search of the 
                                                 
171 Typically, courts find a vehicle’s presence in a “high-crime” or “high drug-
trafficking” area to be particularly relevant in determining whether an officer has 
reasonable suspicion.  Harris, supra note 114, at 998.  These factors, however, allow the 
court to use racial and ethnic stereotypes to establish reasonable suspicion, resulting in 
many more stops of minority populations.  Prohibiting officers from using these two 
factors would help reduce the amount of racial and ethnic stereotyping, thereby equating 
the privacy awarded to all populations.  See id. at 997-98; Margaret Raymond, Down on 
the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in 
Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 112 (1999).  See generally 
Katherine Y. Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction 
Absent Racial Profiling, 54 DUKE L.J. 1089 (2004) (discussing how race is used in 
determining whether to stop a vehicle and how problematic that can be).  
 
172 Anecdotal evidence suggests that GPS navigation systems frequently take drivers on 
routes the driver may not have chosen on his or her own.  The value of an officer’s 
observation that an AV is in a “high-crime” area is substantially lessened if the operator 
has not chosen the route.  
 
173 See generally Whorf, supra note 2. 
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vehicle.  By restricting routine stops, the government arguably loses an 
important mechanism to prevent illegal drug use and trafficking.  In 
Prouse, the Court explained that because alternative mechanisms for 
ensuring safety on the roads existed, the stop just to check a driver’s 
license and registration was overly intrusive.174  That might not be the 
case with drug-interdiction stops if the police are restricted from stopping 
AVs because of the nature of the vehicles.  If stops are more restricted, the 
police will arguably be losing a significant mechanism for ensuring drugs 
remain off the street.  As a result, the government will likely suggest that 
stops of AVs without a traffic violation are reasonable and necessary.  The 
government’s argument loses some traction, though, because of the 
possibility of conducting stops based on reasonable suspicion obtained 
from prior extrinsic observation and from tipsters.175  In reality, the police 
still have a significant mechanism to ensure this government interest is 
met without interfering with individuals’ privacy.  
 
[30] Not only will the police retain a mechanism for stopping AVs, the 
police will still be able to establish probable cause to search AVs without 
a physically present operator in almost the same way they currently 
establish probable cause to search.  Once the vehicle is stopped, the police 
must establish probable cause to search the vehicle or obtain consent to 
search from the driver.176  The police often establish probable cause to 
search based on the actions of the driver, smells emanating from the 
                                                 
174 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).  The government tried to argue that it 
should be allowed to make stops solely for the purpose of checking the driver’s license 
and registration to ensure safety on the roads, but the Court rejected that argument.  Id. at 
658-59.  The Court said it was “unconvinced that the incremental contribution to highway 
safety of the random spot check justifies the practice under the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. 
at 659. 
 
175 See supra Part III.A. 
 
176 See infra Part III.B (discussing consent to search). 
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vehicle, or observations of the inside of the vehicle.177  Officers will still 
be able to speak directly with a physically present operator of an AV if the 
vehicle is stopped, and the officer will still be able to ask the operator 
basic investigatory questions.178  Again, the current “probable cause to 
search” analysis will remain unchanged in that scenario.  When AVs are 
operated without a physically present operator, however, the police will be 
restrained from speaking with the operator.179  As a result, the police may 
be slightly hindered in establishing probable cause to search. Still, officers 
can establish probable cause based on scents emanating from the vehicle 
or based on a signal from a drug-detection dog.180  If the contraband being 
transported has a pungent odor, the officer could still establish probable 
cause just as easily as he would with a traditional vehicle.  Likewise, the 
numerous exceptions to the probable cause requirement would enable the 
officer to search in many situations.181  For example, if the trafficker failed 
                                                 
177 See, e.g., Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 259-61 (1982) (per curiam) (holding that 
probable cause to search was satisfied when the officer saw an open bottle of alcohol in 
the vehicle); State v. Betz, 815 So. 2d 627, 633 (Fla. 2002) (explaining that “the smell of 
burnt marijuana, in combination with other circumstances, leads to law enforcement 
officers’ possession of probable cause to search the entirety of the motor vehicle”); State 
v. Longo, 608 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Iowa 2000) (holding that the smell of burnt marijuana 
helped established probable cause to search the entire vehicle). 
 
178 See State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659, 668 (Neb. 2006) (explaining that 
following a traffic stop for speeding, an officer may ask the driver for his or her license 
and registration, may ask about the purpose of the driver’s travel, may run a search for 
outstanding warrants, and may ask the passengers other similar routine questions); see 
also State v. Sweeney, 227 P.3d 868, 873 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (permitting the officer’s 
questions regarding the driver’s final destination, but not the further suspicionless 
extension of the stop after the driver refused to consent to a search). 
 
179 If, however, the AV manufacturers install a program to contact the operator at the time 
of the stop, the officer would still be able to speak with and question the operator.  See 
infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 
180 See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text (discussing drug-detection dog sniffs). 
 
181 See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing the various exceptions to 
probable cause). 
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to conceal of the product, the officer would have authority to search based 
on the contraband being in plain view.182  In the situation where a 
trafficker creates a special enclosed compartment to house the drugs 
within the AV, plain view and likely scent will not be helpful.  In that 
situation, the officer may be unable to establish probable cause absent a 
drug-detection dog or prior extrinsic observation.183  Still, all it would take 
to establish probable cause to conduct a search would be a signal from a 
drug dog.184  Thus, AVs being operated without a physically present 
driver should not result in much, if any, additional restriction on the ability 
of the police to establish probable cause to search a vehicle.  Any 
additional restriction on the police is already remedied by the numerous 
automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. 
 
B.  Consensual Searches and AVs 
 
[31] If an officer cannot immediately establish probable cause to search, 
police can often get authority to search vehicles by consent of the 
                                                 
182 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990) (holding that the seizure of evidence 
found in plain view does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even absent inadvertence). 
 
183 If the stop itself were based on information obtained during prior extrinsic 
observation, the officer may have enough to make a search as well.  Whether that is the 
case will be dependent upon the extent of suspicion obtained; in other words, whether or 
not the stop was based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  Still, it might be the 
case that the prior extrinsic observation was accompanied with a tip that established 
reasonable suspicion to stop. Probable cause might then be established if the officers 
further corroborate part of the tip upon examining the exterior of the vehicle.  See, e.g., 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (holding that an anonymous tip later 
corroborated was enough to establish reasonable suspicion to make a stop); United States 
v. Jones, 700 F.3d 615, 622 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining that “a tip predicting future 
behavior, not known to the general public, may be worthy of significant weight to the 
extent that it demonstrates that the informant has some inside information or familiarity 
with the defendant’s affairs” thereby giving the officer probable cause to search). 
 
184 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983); United States v. 
Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 919 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 363 
(10th Cir. 1989). 
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driver.185  Police frequently request to search during routine traffic 
stops.186  Of those who are asked to consent, most do.187  Consent searches 
are becoming part of routine traffic stops and are unreasonably 
interrupting the travels of drivers, regardless of their culpability in any 
kind of criminal activity.188  The Court has not specifically authorized an 
operator who is not physically present to consent and has not addressed 
whether an officer’s reliance on that consent would be reasonable.  One 
possible solution to this issue is for the AV manufacturers to create a 
method for immediately contacting the operator in the event of a stop.189  
For example, the AV could send the operator a message as soon as the 
                                                 
185 See supra Part II.D. 
 
186 See LaFave, supra note 158, at 1852, 1891-92. 
 
187 Id. at 1891.  LaFave further cites a study that found approximately ninety percent of 
people consent to a search when one is requested by an officer.  Id. at 1891 n.274 (citing 
Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality, 
Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 533-35 (2001)).  When faced with the authority of the police, 
many are willing to sacrifice their rights without thinking twice.  See, e.g., Tatum Ryan, 
White Lake Man Stopped at Gunpoint During Search for I-96 Shooter, HARTLANDPATCH 
(Oct. 29, 2012, 5:01 PM), http://brighton.patch.com/articles/local-man-searched-for-
weapons-on-way-to-work (discussing an incident where an innocent man was stopped 
and forced out of his vehicle at gun point based on nothing more than reasonable 
suspicion). Following the event the man explained he “was completely fine with what 
they did.”  Id. 
 
188 LaFave, supra note 158, at 1891, 1893. 
 
189 For example, the operator could be required to input a contact number before engaging 
the vehicle; that number could be obtained by the officer scanning a code on the vehicle. 
This might unconstitutionally delay the stop, though, if the police cannot get a hold of the 
operator for whatever reason.  See supra note 155 and accompanying text.  On the other 
hand, it could be required that the operator be available whenever the vehicle is engaged.  
Of course, this assumes that the court will accept consent obtained over the Internet or by 
phone.  
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 1 
 
 41 
vehicle has been stopped by the police,190 and the operator could either 
approve or refuse the search.191  This procedure would ensure the police 
maintain their ability to request a consensual search. 
 
[32] The government could also argue that AV owners, by virtue of 
their ownership and licensing of the vehicles, provide implied consent to 
police searches following a lawful stop when operating their vehicles in 
autonomous mode on state roads.  Currently, many states have implied 
consent statutes that provide that a person driving on state highways has 
impliedly consented to blood, breath, urine, or saliva tests when a driver 
has been arrested for operating under the influence and the officer had 
reasonable grounds to believe such offense was committed prior to the 
arrest.192  These implied consent statutes for intoxication require enough 
evidence to make an arrest.193  The correlative standard for AVs without a 
physically present driver would be enough information to establish 
probable cause to arrest the operator for trafficking drugs.194  If the officer 
                                                 
190 This mechanism could also be used to help the officer establish probable cause to 
search, which is another reason why the government’s power under the Fourth 
Amendment should not be extended.  See Part II.A (discussing probable cause to search 
an AV without a physically present driver).  
 
191 The Court would still need to approve this method of consent.  
 
192 See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13384 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1) (2013); 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-5-55, 40-5-67.1 (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 577.020 (2013); NEV. 
REV. STAT. §§ 484C.150-484C.160 (2012).  Federal law contains a similar provision 
applicable to persons who operate a vehicle “in the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3118 (2006).  Some states provide even 
less protection of drivers with commercial driver’s licenses.  See, e.g., Robinson v. Kan. 
Dep’t. of Revenue, 154 P.3d 508, 510-11 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a driver’s 
commercial driver’s license could be suspended for refusal to consent without specific 
notice of such even when the driver was driving a non-commercial vehicle at the time of 
the stop). 
 
193 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.  
 
194 This correlative standard does not fit this situation seamlessly.  Any stop of the AV 
based on probable cause to arrest the operator would be speculative, at best, because the 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 1 
 
 42 
could establish probable cause to arrest without a physically present 
driver, it is likely the officer would also have probable cause to believe 
evidence of the crime was contained within the vehicle.195  Thus, the 
officer would have authority to search since an officer with probable cause 
to search can search without a warrant,196 so the directly analogous 
principle would only be marginally applicable.  The alternative would 
require a legislature to pass a statute requiring AV operators who intend to 
operate the vehicle without a physically present operator to give implied 
consent to all searches.  While such a statute might solve the problem of 
obtaining consent, it would most likely, as it should, be found to be an 
unreasonable and unconstitutional intrusion.197  Such a provision would 
essentially permit the government to have unrestricted access to AVs.  It is 
improbable that the Court would accept such a provision since the Court 
has refused to find that an individual loses all Fourth Amendment 
protection when operating a vehicle.  Similarly, given the extensive search 
exceptions for automobiles already in place, any further extension would 
be unreasonable and unnecessary.198 
                                                                                                                         
officer could have no way of knowing for certain that the one for whom he has probable 
cause to arrest is actually operating the AV.  It seems more likely that the officer would 
have probable cause to believe that the AV in question was involved in the trafficking 
operation.  Thus, the most likely situation would be that the officer has probable cause to 
believe contraband would be found within the AV, giving the officer authority to search. 
 
195 Likely, the officer would have probable cause to arrest based on an investigation of 
the operator of the vehicle and his drug trafficking scheme.  If that is so, the officer 
would also have probable cause to believe that contraband would be found within the 
AV, and the officer could search based on that.  
 
196 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-57 (1925).  
 
197 See, e.g., Ohio v. Mesley, 732 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (“The Fourth 
Amendment protects against unreasonable government intrusions, whether a search or a 
seizure, into areas of recognized privacy expectations.”) (citations omitted). 
 
198 Current automobile exceptions have eliminated the warrant requirement, permitted 
searches incident to arrest, tolerated limited searches for weapons, and allowed limited 
searches to determine the identity of the operator.  See supra notes 140-43 and 
accompanying text. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 1 
 
 43 
[33] Additionally, the Supreme Court has already validated dog sniffs 
of vehicles lawfully stopped, as long as the sniff does not unreasonably 
prolong the stop itself.199  The use of drug dogs may eliminate the consent 
issue in most situations.  A signal from a drug-detection dog is all the 
officer needs to establish probable cause to search the entire vehicle.200  
Thus, if the police instituted a policy of sniffing all AVs lawfully stopped, 
they could potentially get into any vehicle carrying contraband, without 
regard to consent.201  The biggest problem for the state would be ensuring 
the stop is not prolonged any more than is necessary to investigate the 
purpose of the stop. A stop and the subsequent questioning or detention 
must be reasonably related in scope to the reason for the stop.202  Because 
drug dogs are often not readily available and obtaining one may prolong 
                                                 
199 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (explaining that “an investigative 
detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose 
of the stop” and that “the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive 
means reasonably available”); see also United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916-17 
(8th Cir. 1994) (finding the stop was not unreasonably prolonged when the officer and 
the suspect had to wait an hour for a drug dog).  When stops become “unreasonably 
prolonged” is somewhat unclear.  In United States v. Sharpe, the Court permitted a 
twenty-minute detention while the parties waited for a drug dog.  470 U.S. 675, 687-88 
(1985).  The Court noted that the only behavior that extended the length of the detention 
was the driver’s evasive actions when the officers tried to stop him.  Id.  Similarly, in 
United States v. Bloomfield, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals validated a detention of 
one hour because the officer took immediate action to obtain a drug dog.  Bloomfield, 40 
F.3d at 916-17.  In United States v. Place, by contrast, the Court found an airplane 
traveler’s detention for ninety minutes while waiting for a drug dog to be unreasonable 
because almost the entire length of the detention was the result of police incompetence.  
462 U.S. 696, 708-10 (1983).  Accordingly, the inquiry seems to hinge on how quickly 
and reasonably the officers act and less upon how quickly the dog is actually procured.  
 
200 See, e.g., Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 919; United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 363 (10th 
Cir. 1989).  
 
201 Likewise, the other automobile exceptions are still available to police if a drug dog 
cannot be obtained.  See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text. 
 
202 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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the stop,203 and because the other exceptions do not apply in all 
circumstances, the consent issues will still need to be addressed if the 
government is to have authority to obtain consent to search an AV.  The 
best option is for the AV manufacturers to include a mechanism for 
obtaining consent204 and for legislatures to require AVs operators who are 
not physically present to be available to consent via the mechanism 
created by the AV manufacturers.  This would ensure the officer has the 
opportunity to obtain consent, thereby ensuring the government retains its 
ability to conduct consent searches when a drug dog is not readily 
available.  Similarly, this would guarantee the individuals’ privacy and 
ability to refuse a search is protected.  The interests of both parties would 
be protected and balanced similar to the way they are currently 
balanced.205   
 
[34] If the operator can somehow consent without being present, or an 
implied consent statute is permitted, the problem becomes ensuring the 
search is limited to the consent obtained.  Conversely, if the operator does 
not consent, there is an issue of ensuring the police do not move forward 
with the search anyway.  These problems could easily be remedied by the 
AV manufacturer installing interior cameras accessible from the device 
used to operate the vehicle.  Further, AV owners may want to send their 
AV to daycare to pick up a child, or send the AV to take the child to 
football practice. Currently, it is not settled whether consent of a minor is 
                                                 
203 See, e.g., Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 917 (“When police need the assistance of a drug dog 
in roadside Terry stops, it will in general take time to obtain one; local government police 
forces and the state highway patrol cannot be expected to have drug dogs immediately 
available to all officers in the field at all times.”).  
 
204 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 
205 Arguably, much of the feared coercion possible during a stop of a traditional vehicle 
may be gone because the operator may be less likely to submit to the officer’s show of 
authority while she is sitting on her couch waiting for her AV to arrive.  Cf. Rebecca 
Strauss, We Can Do This the Easy Way Or the Hard Way: The Use of Deceit to Induce 
Consent Searches, 100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 882, 886-87 (2002) (discussing coercion in 
the context of consent searches). 
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sufficient.206  The current trend in the lower courts is to permit a minor to 
consent in some instances, but these cases have dealt specifically with a 
minor’s authority to consent to the search of the home in which the child 
resides.207  The applicability of these cases to consent to search an AV is 
unclear.208  The Court could find that if the child is frequently left with 
exclusive control of the AV, meaning the child is often left to travel in the 
AV alone, or if the adult operator permits the child to consent, then the 
child may be able to consent to a search.209  On the other hand, if the 
“degree of access” the child has to the car is limited, the child’s ability to 
consent may likewise be limited.210  Thus, if the minor is given frequent 
exclusive control of the AV, the consent of a minor should be permissible 
if the minor has the capacity to weigh the issues at hand.  For example, a 
fifteen-year-old may be able to contemplate and understand the 
consequences of permitting the search and the consequences of denying 
the search.  On the other hand, a five-year-old probably would not. 
Further, to ensure consent of a minor is freely and voluntarily given and to 
dispel much of the concern for coercion, the police should be advised to 
inform the minor of her right to decline the officer’s request to search.  
                                                 
206 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. 
 
207 See supra note 154 and accompanying text; Henning, supra note 153, at 72-73 
(explaining that the courts that have heard the issue have held that minors have the right 
to challenge searches of their living spaces).  The ability of minors to challenge searches 
suggests they also have the authority to initially consent to such a search.  
 
208 A child’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the home in which she resides is more 
easily established than the child’s reasonable expectation of privacy in her mother’s AV 
since the child likely stores personal belongings and other intimate things in the home 
while the same cannot likely be said for the AV.  
 
209 See, e.g., United States v. Clutter, 914 F.2d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1990) (permitting the 
defendant’s fourteen and twelve-year-old children to consent to a search of their home 
because the children were frequently left in exclusive control of the home). 
 
210 See United States v. Barkovitz, 29 F. Supp. 2d 411, 413 (E.D. Mich. 1998) 
(differentiating this case from Clutter because there was no showing that the children 
were ever given exclusive control of the home).  
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The Court, though, should establish a workable standard to determine 
when consent of a minor is sufficient.  
 
IV.  HOW FAR SHOULD THE COURT EXTEND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT? 
 
[35] It appears the government may be able to stop and search AVs 
based on probable cause and reasonable suspicion, with slight, if any, shift 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Yet, the question remains whether 
the Court should enable the government to conduct these searches on AVs 
and whether the Court should extend the Fourth Amendment to 
accommodate the government.  The current test and precedent for the 
Fourth Amendment is “arbitrary and unpredictable.”211  It is not clear to 
officers, individuals, or even the courts when reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause has been established.212  Additionally, the more the Court 
extends the government’s power under the Fourth Amendment and the 
                                                 
211 David E. Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding 
Revisited, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47, 56 (2005); see also Phyllis T. Bookspan, 
Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. 
REV. 473, 474-75 (1991) (“Current search and seizure doctrine is inconsistent and 
incoherent.  No one, including the police who are to abide by it, judges who apply it, or 
the people who are protected by it, has any meaningful sense of what the law is.”). 
 
212 Courts have even acknowledged that there cannot be a set of rules to determine these 
cases, which suggests that the determinations made by the courts are based more on who 
the judge is than what the standard ought to be.  See supra notes 117, 134 and 
accompanying text.  Similarly, courts do not always understand the distinction between 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause.  For example, in State v. Lloyd the court 
conflated the two terms by saying the officer had reasonable suspicion to initially 
approach the vehicle when the officer actually had probable cause since the officer’s 
subsequent search had to have been based on probable cause and the same facts that 
supported the “reasonable suspicion” supported the probable cause for the search.  263 
P.3d 557, 563-69 (Utah Ct. App. 2011).  The court said, “[n]evertheless, this seizure was 
constitutional because the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant for a 
brief investigation.  Because there was probable cause to believe that the vehicle 
contained contraband, i.e., crack cocaine [the officer] had authority to ‘search [the] 
automobile and the containers within it.’”  Id. at 568 (first and second emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted) (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)). 
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more ambiguous the test, the less privacy individuals can retain.  On the 
other hand, increasing the government’s power under the Fourth 
Amendment may help legitimize our laws by enabling the police to 
enforce drug laws, human trafficking laws, and immigration laws. 
Ultimately, though, individuals’ privacy interests in their vehicles must 
take priority over the government’s interest in detecting contraband.  
 
[36] Proponents of increased government power might suggest that as 
AVs become more prevalent, the risk that people will use their AVs to 
transport illegal drugs or to engage in other illegal activities will grow 
simply because of ease.  Some members of the Court have recognized the 
need to evolve the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as technology 
evolves.213  Our federal government currently spends approximately $2.6 
billion on enforcing drug laws.214  Not only is the cost of policing and 
restricting illegal drug use high, but the societal costs of drug use are also 
great.215  An estimated $200 to $250 billion is necessary to handle needed 
drug treatment costs throughout the world.216  Additionally, an estimated 
                                                 
213 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(suggesting the Court should account for evolving technology like GPS in making its 
Fourth Amendment determinations regarding one’s expectation of privacy). 
 
214 Rob Reuteman, The Cost-and-Benefit Arguments Around Enforcement, CNBC, (April 
20, 2010 12:03 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36600923/The_CostandBenefit_Arguments_Around_Enforceme
nt.  In 2009, the Drug Enforcement Agency’s budget was $2.6 billion.  Id.  In addition, at 
least eight states spend more than one billion dollars on drug enforcement annually.  Id.  
Those states are New York, Texas, California, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania.  Id.  Granted, some argue that by reducing the restrictions on drugs we can 
reduce the amount spent enforcing such laws; however, that discussion is beyond the 
scope of this note.  
 
215 See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2012, at 4 
(2012), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/WDR2012/WDR_2012_web_small.pdf (discussing societal costs such as 
negative health consequences, decreased productivity, and heavy financial burden).  
 
216 Id. at 4.  These costs can include rudimentary drug treatment programs, but it can also 
be the result of medical costs related to HIV, which affects three million drug users 
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0.9% of gross domestic product is sacrificed to productivity losses within 
the market place associated with drug abuse in the United States.217  This 
illustrates that drug abuse and trafficking continues to be a problem in 
countless facets of our society.  As such, the government arguably has an 
increasing interest, both financial and social, in limiting drug use and drug 
trafficking.  Permitting the use of AVs without much ability to stop and 
search them will likely result in an increase in the amount of money spent 
on policing drugs.  Some may argue that these growing numbers tip the 
scale in favor of the government.218  As a result, some may say that 
despite the ability of officers to stop AVs under the current law, the Court 
ought to extend the Fourth Amendment to permit stops of AVs more 
frequently and more easily.219   
 
[37] While drug abuse and use has significant financial and societal 
costs,220 the cost of individual freedom is much greater.  The Supreme 
                                                                                                                         
worldwide, or hepatitis B and C, which together affect approximately 9.7 million drug 
users.  Id. at 7. 
 
217 Id. at 4. 
 
218 The Court has typically held that the government interest in policing general crime 
control does not outweigh the individual’s privacy interest.  See City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000) (invalidating a checkpoint for illegal drugs because it 
furthered no interest beyond general crime control). 
 
219 The effectiveness of increased drug enforcement to cut other crime has been highly 
debated.  See Bruce L. Benson et al., The Impact of Drug Enforcement on Crime: An 
Investigation of the Opportunity Cost of Police Resources, 31 J. DRUG ISSUES 989, 989-
90 (2001), available at http://jod.sagepub.com/content/31/4/989.refs [hereinafter Is 
Property Crime Caused by Crime].  Some authors suggest that increased drug 
enforcement reduces the police resources to enforce other laws, which ultimately results 
in an increase in property and violent crimes.  See generally Bruce L. Benson et al., Is 
Property Crime Caused by Drug Use or by Drug Enforcement Policy?, 24 APPLIED 
ECON. 679 (1992).  But see generally The Impact of Drug Enforcement on Crime, supra 
(rebutting this argument).  If that is the case, an increase in drug enforcement might not 
be in accordance with public policy. 
 
220 See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text. 
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Court should not extend the Fourth Amendment any further, but instead 
protect individual liberty and privacy by restricting the government’s 
suspicionless access to automobiles, both traditional and autonomous.  
The Court has said that “if the government intrudes . . . the privacy interest 
[of the individual] suffers whether the government’s motivation is to 
investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or 
regulatory standards.”221  Thus, a legitimate government purpose to reduce 
drug trafficking is not enough to justify a violation of the United States 
Constitution.  Instead, the government ought to find ways to fight the “war 
on drugs” without further invading individuals’ constitutionally protected 
rights.  Officers are already improperly using routine traffic stops to search 
for contraband with regular vehicles.222  For example, “[t]he federal 
government has strongly encouraged state and local enforcement officers 
to view the highway as a battleground in the war on drugs.  It has trained 
police officers to use traffic stops to investigate suspected drug 
offenses.”223  Likewise, many courts have essentially accepted that one’s 
presence in a high-crime area without much more is sufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion.224  As a result, minority populations are targeted for 
stops more frequently than others.225 Such practices encourage 
                                                 
221 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978).  
 
222 See Wayne R. LaFave, supra note 158, at 1852-54; see also United States v. Jones, 
234 F.3d 234, 241-42 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 
223 Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
163, 170 n.25 (2002) (citations omitted) 
 
224 See, e.g., Raymond, supra note 171, at 115-24. 
  
225 See generally id. at 116-24 (explaining why using one’s presence in a high-crime area 
is problematic).  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that: 
 
[s]tops based on race or ethnic appearance send the underlying message 
to all our citizens that those who are not white are judged by the color 
of their skin alone. Such stops also send a clear message that those who 
are not white enjoy a lesser degree of constitutional protection—that 
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unconstitutional interference with individuals’ privacy rights and ignore 
the requirement for particularized suspicion. Whether the operator is 
physically present or not, the individual retains a privacy interest in the 
vehicle.  The Court has refused to find that the individual loses all privacy 
interests when using an automobile. Still, the trend in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence with regard to automobiles is the continued erosion of 
individuals’ rights in their vehicles.226  Any further extension of the Fourth 
Amendment with regard to automobile stops and searches would 
essentially eliminate all individual privacy interests in the automobile.227 
 
[38] The protections guaranteed to individuals under the Fourth 
Amendment have slowly been deteriorating.  The Court continues to 
empower the government to invade a space that is inherently private to 
most people.228  Professor David Cole argues that “[t]he war on drugs has 
put political pressure on judges, which has led them to consistently 
                                                                                                                         
they are in effect assumed to be potential criminals first and individuals 
second. 
 
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000).  
 
226 See Sara L. Shaeffer, Note, Another Dent in Our Fourth Amendment Rights: The 
Supreme Court’s Precarious Extension of the Automobile Exception in Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 45 S.D. L. REV. 422, 424-26 (2000).  See generally James A. Adams, The 
Supreme Court’s Improbable Justifications for Restriction of Citizens’ Fourth 
Amendment Privacy Expectations in Automobiles, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 833 (1999) 
(discussing the diminished Fourth Amendment protection in automobiles). 
 
227 Similarly, this extension is not necessary.  Officers have numerous exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment that enable them to get into vehicles, one being consent.  Consent 
searches essentially provide limitless discretion on the part of officers; any further power 
is not necessary.  See Rebecca Strauss, supra note 205, at 877-81.  If anything, the 
police’s power should be lessened.  
 
228 See generally Chris K. Visser, Comment, Without a Warrant, Probable Cause, or 
Reasonable Suspicion: Is There Any Meaning to the Fourth Amendment While Driving a 
Car?, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1683 (1999) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Whren, Robinette, and Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), have allowed officers to 
invade individuals’ privacy more easily).  
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overlook constitutional violations by the police where drugs are involved 
and to bend and stretch the law to afford the police greater ability to search 
without probable cause.”229  Similarly, the political support for extending 
drug checkpoints is simply a campaigning mechanism.230  The current 
trend of slowly allowing more government intrusion will result in 
significant violations of individual liberty and Americans who are pacified 
to these government intrusions.231  Americans currently spend a 
significant portion of their lives in automobiles.  The average American 
spends more than twenty-five minutes commuting to work, each way.232  
For the average person, this amounts to approximately 500,000 minutes or 
just over 347 days over the course of one’s career, and these figures do not 
account for the numerous hours spent commuting elsewhere.233  It stands 
to reason that individuals have a significant privacy interest in the space 
where they will spend nearly an entire year of their lives, and some far 
                                                 
229 Comment: A Sane Drug Policy, PROGRESSIVE, October 1999, at 8, 8. 
 
230 See Suzanne Graves, Note, Checkpoints and the Fourth Amendment: Saving Grace or 
Constitutional Martyr?, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1487, 1517 (2000).  Graves explains that 
“[t]he numbers associated with narcotics and weapons checkpoints do not reflect a 
serious endeavor to apprehend criminals and deter future crime.  Rather, they pacify the 
taxpayers while at the same time threaten their basic liberties.”  Id. at 1517-18.  
 
231 See Wendy Kaminer, Taking Liberties: The New Assault on Freedom, AM. PROSPECT, 
Jan./Feb. 1999, at 33, 39, available at http://prospect.org/article/taking-liberties-0 (“The 
trouble is that many people are becoming accustomed to submitting to authority in the 
hope of remaining safe.  Most of us trudge sheeplike through airports, readily complying 
with all the demands of low-level security personnel, who are themselves applying, 
without question, the dictates of their superiors.”). 
 
232 BRIAN MCKENZIE, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, OUT-OF-STATE AND LONG 
COMMUTES: 2011, at 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/pdf/acs_20_out_of_state_and_long_commute
s_report.pdf. 
   
233 These figures are based on a person commuting five days a week for fifty weeks a 
year who enters the workforce at age twenty-five and retires at sixty-five.  Volvo 
estimates people spend more than a hundred hours commuting per year.  See Ross, supra 
note 44. 
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more.  The Court ought to recognize that our society is becoming 
increasingly mobile, resulting in individuals spending more time in their 
vehicles.234  Thus, the Court should acknowledge the significant privacy 
interest Americans have in their vehicles and adjust the Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence accordingly.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
[39] The introduction of AVs into our society is likely to change our 
society in countless ways.  Inevitably these changes will bring both legal 
and social challenges.  While many of the resulting issues may have more 
clear solutions, like insurance235 or products liability,236 the effect AVs 
will have on the application of the Fourth Amendment is vague at best.  
Current jurisprudence suggests that the police may not have been able to 
stop the vehicle in Arvizu had it been operated autonomously without a 
physically present operator or any passengers.237  When police are unable 
to observe behavior of the occupants of the vehicle, it is more difficult to 
establish reasonable suspicion to make a stop without a traffic violation.  It 
is especially difficult to establish reasonable suspicion for a spontaneous 
stop.238  Since traffic violations should be rare, if ever, with an AV,239 
                                                 
234 Additionally, once AVs take over the roads, people will likely use their vehicles as 
offices rather than simply for travel.  Once that happens, the Court may be forced to 
afford more privacy to the individual.  
 
235 See generally Peterson, supra note 82.  
 
236 See generally Garza, supra note 82. 
 
237 See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (holding that reasonable 
suspicion was established based on the location of the vehicle and observations of the 
driver and passengers given the officer’s experience). It is questionable whether the 
circumstances in Arvizu, absent the observations of the driver and the passengers, would 
have amounted to reasonable suspicion. 
 
238 See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text 
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officers may not be able to stop as many AVs as they might traditional 
vehicles.  Similarly, the AV engaged by the operator resting on his couch 
in New York240 may not have been stoppable absent prior extrinsic 
observation or a tip from a tipster.241  Thus, the government might request 
an extension of the Fourth Amendment to permit more stops.242 
 
[40] The current trend of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests 
that the Court may accept the government’s argument and extend its 
authority to conduct stops and searches of automobiles—particularly stops 
and searches of AVs in order to prevent the drug trafficker from New 
York from transporting contraband in his AV.  While the government does 
have a legitimate interest in preventing drug and other illegal trafficking, 
the price we pay for this is our individual liberty and freedom from undue 
government influence.  Extension of the government’s rights under the 
Fourth Amendment will open the door to unprecedented government 
intrusion.  The framers of the Fourth Amendment intended to protect 
individuals from the intrusions the founding fathers experienced at the 
hands of the British government.243  Without suggesting we ought to 
adhere strictly to the framers intent, we ought to consider the broad 
purpose for the amendment; that is, protecting our individual liberty and 
privacy.244  Thus, the Supreme Court ought to reject an extension of the 
Fourth Amendment in order to curtail the current trend of sacrificing 
                                                                                                                         
239 See Devin Desai, Autonomous Vehicles: Unintended Upsides and Changes, 
MADISONIAN.NET (Mar. 17, 2013), http://madisonian.net/2013/03/17/autonomous-
vehicles-unintended-upsides-and-changes/; supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 
240 See supra INTRODUCTION. 
 
241 See discussion supra ¶ 28. 
 
242 It might even be the case that the Court refuses to view AVs under the automobile 
exception.  Instead, the Court might handle AVs as it does mail and other containers, but 
that analysis is beyond the scope of this note. 
 
243 See Dinger & Dinger, supra note 87 at 6. 
 
244 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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individual liberty and extending the government’s power to invade our 
private space.  
 
 
